The Grandchildren of Immigrants in Western Europe: Patterns of Assimilation Among the Emerging Third Generation

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Abstract. Migration scholars have long regarded the trajectory of the 3rd generation as a critical test of assimilation. However, scholarship to date has been limited and largely focused on socioeconomic attainment. In this article, we rely on a large dataset of adolescent respondents in England, Germany, and the Netherlands to compare the 2nd, the 3rd generation in terms of their social networks and cultural identities. On the one hand, the 3rd generation shows stronger ties to the native 4+ generation alongside weaker ties to co-ethnics. On the other hand, we document comparable, albeit more moderate dynamics of assimilation over generations when it comes to national and ethnic identification. While these patterns vary depending on the country of destination and the ethnic origin group, our results point to a dominant trend of assimilation at the third generation and suggest future challenges to provide a more durable assessment of Western European countries' incorporation of postwar migration waves two generations after settlement.

Keywords. third generation, Western Europe, assimilation, immigration, ethnic boundaries

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Introduction

   The period of sustained economic growth following World War Two and its associated reconstruction efforts led many Western European governments to admit large numbers of foreign workers from countries with whom they had colonial ties or bilateral agreements. These workers and their families, who joined them in the 1970s following family reunification policies, soon became permanent immigrant minorities in Europe. The coming of age of their children – the 2nd generation – led to unprecedented demographic change among European nation-states that, by and large and except for France and the United Kingdom, had not hitherto known large influx of migrants from outside Europe. We now stand at a critical juncture wherein the 3rd generation – the grandchildren of immigrants – is emerging, and with them the potential to establish a durable assessment of Western European countries' successful incorporation of the migration waves of the postwar era. Are we witnessing a pattern of assimilation or persistent ethnic segmentation in the emerging 3rd generation?

   Assimilation theories have long recognized the grandchildren of immigrants as a yardstick of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Gans 1992; Jiménez, Park, and Pedroza 2018). In recent years, and despite issues of data availability (Duncan and Trejo 2018; Tran 2018), migration scholars have started to study the socioeconomic fate of the 3rd generation (Becker 2011; Duncan et al. 2020; Ortiz and Telles 2017; Pupaza, Harber-Aschan, and Wilson 2023; Zorlu and van Gent 2023; Drouhot et al. 2023). However, there exists to date limited work on other empirical dimensions of assimilation among the 3rd generation. Here, we conceive of assimilation in terms of generational change in the salience of ethnic boundaries, which we empirically measure using national and ethnic identification and network integration (Alba 2005; Wimmer 2008, 2013). In the absence of large-scale data on ethnic boundaries among the adult 3rd generation, we analyze several synthetic generations of contemporaneous adolescents sampled in secondary schools within three major European countries of immigration – Germany, the Netherlands, and England. The data we use oversample immigrant-origin adolescents and provide an early look at the assimilation of the 3rd generation. How strongly does the 3rd generation feel they belong to their residence country, and how included are they within natives' friendship networks?[2] Conversely, how strongly do they identify with their ethnic origin group, and how much do they maintain friendship ties with co-ethnics? Together, answers to these questions can help us assess memberships in the social worlds of the native country and the immigrant-origin group are articulated at the 3rd generation.

Background: the grandchildren of immigrants as a litmus test of assimilation

The significance of the 3rd generation

Assimilation is a multigenerational convergence process in terms of socioeconomic opportunities, social relations (e.g., friendship and marriage), and cultural identities (e.g., ethnic and national identification) between immigrant-origin and native populations (Drouhot and Nee 2019:178–79). Migration scholars have long regarded the fate of the 3rd generation as a litmus test of assimilation. In the United States, this is based on the trajectories of yesteryear's European immigrants, who collectively underwent large-scale social mobility

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[2] By "native", we simply refer to the portion of the population without any migration background, in effect those whose parents and grandparents are all born in the survey country (i.e., 4th + generation).

and a general decline in the significance of ethnic origins for their life chances and identities in the 3rd generation and beyond (Alba 1985; Alba and Nee 2003; Waters 1990). The past experiences of European immigrants, and particularly that of their grandchildren, served to produce influential, three-generation models of cultural adaptation (Fishman 1966; Gans 1979; Hansen 1938; Herberg 1955), to cite only a few emblematic studies. Empirical works on the 3rd generation were pivotal to the revision of earlier accounts of "straight-line assimilation" (e.g., Warner and Srole 1945) and to measuring either "complete" assimilation (Gordon 1964; Lieberson and Waters 1988; Shibutani and Kwan 1965) or a "bumpy-line", non-linear pattern of adaptation between the 2nd and 3rd generations (Gans 1992).

Past empirical studies on the third generation in the United States

Based on past (and mostly European) migration in the U.S., scholars agree that we are unlikely to see the children of immigrants reach socioeconomic parity with natives within just two generations, for it was historically "only with the 3rd […] generation that the powerful undercurrent of assimilation came unmistakably to the surface" (Alba and Nee 2003:215). In recent years, large-scale studies relying on newly digitalized census data have put such assertions to stringent empirical tests. For instance, a recent study (Lowrey et al. 2021) indeed shows - in line with older work (Alba 1985; Neidert and Farley 1985; Perlmann 2005; Smith 2003) - that the grandchildren of immigrants had fully caught up (and even surpassed) native-born Whites in terms of educational attainment[3]. Scholars have also documented high rates of ethnically mixed marriages (Logan and Shin 2012) and English-only language among the 3rd-generation descendants of 19th century immigrant groups, in particular those of European origin (Alba et al. 2002; Alba and Nee 2003; Lopez 1982).

Assimilation patterns among the "new" 2nd generation – the children of non-White, such as post-1965 migrants in the U.S. – have generated much research and scholarly debate (Alba et al. 2011; Alba and Foner 2015b; Alba and Nee 2003; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Portes and Zhou 1993). Similarly identifying the "new" 3rd generation as "the next and most significant chapter of contemporary assimilation" (Jiménez, Park and Pedroza 2018: 1041), U.S. scholars are now turning to study the grandchildren of immigrants who arrived from Asia as well as Central America following the 1965 Hart-Celler act (Jiménez et al. 2018; Logan and Shin 2012; Smith and Brown 2019). Thus far, empirical studies of the new 3rd generation in the U.S. have focused on economic attainment (Duncan et al. 2020; Orrenius and Zavodny 2019; Ortiz and Telles 2017), linguistic practices (Alba et al. 2002) as well as mixed descent and racial identification (Jiménez et al. 2018). This scholarship has been limited by significant issues of data quality and availability, in particular missing information on grandparental place of birth in most publicly available data (Duncan and Trejo 2018; Tran 2018). Beyond the American case, an interest in the emerging 3rd generation can also be seen in recent research on Australia (e.g., Forrest and Kusek 2016; Johnston et al. 2015) and Israel (Cohen et al. 2021; Cohen, Lewin-Epstein, and Lazarus 2019).

The third generation in contemporary Western Europe

In Western Europe, migration scholars have recently started to study the grandchildren of immigrants. The contemporary 3rd generation reflects the heritage of older

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[3] However, see Borjas 1994, Carliner 1980, Livingston and Kahn 2002, and Ward 2020 for studies of occupational and income attainment suggesting slower intergenerational progress, and Telles and Ortiz 2008 for a study of 3rd-generation educational disadvantage among Mexican Americans.

migratory movements from neighboring European countries starting in the late 19th century and linked to the labor needs of industrializing economies. The Polish in Germany, the Irish in England or the Italians in France are typical in this regard (Lucassen, Feldman, and Oltmer 2006; Moch 2003; Noiriel 1996). However, the contemporary 3rd generation also includes populations originating from outside Europe (e.g., the Moroccans in the Netherlands, the Turks in Germany and the Pakistani in England) and arriving to satisfy labor shortages resulting from post-war reconstruction efforts (Castles 1986; Schönwälder 2004). While originally considered temporary workers, family reunification policies from the post-1973 period effectively turned these migrants and their families into permanent ethnic minorities, often from a markedly different ethnoracial and religious background than that of the majority populations. These populations and their descendants form "low-status" groups, concentrating stigma and disadvantage in their respective context, including at the 2nd generation (Alba and Holdaway 2013; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Heath et al. 2008).

Research efforts to understand the fate of the 3rd generation in Europe have largely focused on socioeconomic attainment and yielded mixed findings across countries thus far. In Germany, 3rd generation youth appear to be on a path of socioeconomic assimilation, whereby gaps with natives are either non-existent or entirely explained by family socioeconomic background (Becker 2011; Hunkler and Schotte 2023). In the Netherlands, Zorlu and van Gent (2023) used registry data to document a similar pattern of relative parity. In Sweden (Ekberg, Hammarstedt, and Shukur 2010; Hunkler and Schotte 2023; Pupaza, Harber-Aschan, and Wilson 2023) and France (Drouhot et al. 2023; Vallot 2016) by contrast, scholars have documented patterns of relative stagnation at the 3rd generation in terms of educational and labor market outcomes. It thus appears that patterns of socioeconomic attainment at the 3rd generation are country- and outcome-specific.

Ethnic boundaries among the grandchildren of immigrants: networks and identities

Despite these recent studies, scholarly knowledge on *relational* (e.g., friendship networks) and *cultural* (e.g., identities and belonging) dimensions of assimilation among the 3rd generation in Western Europe remains lacking. Mixedness in social networks and the harmonious articulation of ethnic and national identities among immigrant descendants arguably capture the endpoint of assimilation, whereby individuals' ethnic origins become increasingly less relevant to members of other ethnic groups, typically the majority group, and individuals on both sides of the boundary see themselves as increasingly alike (Alba and Nee 2003:11). In line with most empirical research to date on the 3rd generation, neoassimilation theory heavily focuses on immigrant socioeconomic attainment – the "siren call to assimilation" (Alba and Nee 2003, 67) - and assumes that assimilation on relational and cultural dimensions follows from it (Gans 2007). However, recent work has problematized these assumptions (Drouhot 2023; Schachter 2016). Furthermore, missing research on networks and identities at the 3rd generation is regrettable since literature on the 2nd generation remains ambiguous on the intensity of network segregation (Leszczensky and Pink 2019; Smith et al. 2016), and on feelings of being a part of the "mainstream" (Alba and Foner 2015b; Alba and Nee 2003; Drouhot and Nee 2019:191; Leszczensky and Pink 2019). In this paper, we wish to exploit the adjudicative potential of the 3rd generation to formulate an early, cross-country diagnosis of assimilation in terms of networks and identities.

Among migration scholars, ethnic boundaries have become a familiar and practical way to think about how immigrants progressively gain membership in the destination society (Wimmer 2013; Zolberg and Woon 1999; Alba 2005; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Schachter

2016). At the individual level, an ethnic boundary is a subjectively felt, categorical distinction between "us" and "them" based on ethnicity (Wimmer 2013: 7-10). In turn, the nature of ethnic boundaries is inherently social, and depends on how such categorical distinctions map onto larger patterns of intergroup inequality and relational segregation – for instance in terms of marital unions and friendships (Wimmer 2013). Strong or intergenerationally stable ethnic boundaries – whereby ethnic origins continue to shape networks and identities among later immigrant generations – signal limited assimilation. Hence, our approach directly builds on Alba and Nee's (2003:11) definition of assimilation as the "decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences."

Empirically, we regard intergenerational differences in network and identities as crucial yardsticks to measure assimilation and the decreasing salience of ethnic boundaries (Drouhot and Nee 2019: 178-9, Wimmer 2008, 2013, Kruse and Kroneberg 2019, Leszczensky and Pink 2019, Kroneberg, Kruse and Wimmer 2021). Strong ethnic boundaries (i.e., "social boundaries," Lamont and Molnár 2002:168) crystallize at the nexus of identities and networks: "a boundary displays both a categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social classification…the latter to everyday networks of relationships" (Wimmer 2008: 975). In other words, the strength of ethnic boundaries is predicated on both social relations and identities.

At present, it is difficult to study networks and identities among adult members of the new 3rd generation in Western Europe due to a lack of suitable data. We therefore focus on ethnic boundaries among adolescents growing up in three European countries of immigration (England, the Netherlands, and Germany). Adolescents growing up in these multiethnic contexts are of interest because they are at a life stage where social relations and identities are still crystallizing. They may have plentiful opportunities for forming interethnic ties (for instance at school) and developing a sense of belonging but may not do so if ethnic boundaries remain strong (Zhao 2023). Conversely, their ability to form friendship across ethnic differences may be hampered by urban segregation and sorting into schools (Kruse et al. 2016; Mouw and Entwisle 2006). Our study builds on a recent but lively research tradition in Europe sampling adolescents within ethnically diverse schools (Kalter et al. 2018; Kruse and Kroneberg 2019; Leszczensky and Pink 2019; Smith et al. 2016) – arguably a crucial institutional setting to produce social cohesion across ethnic differences.

Ethnic boundaries at the 3rd generation: blurry or bright?

We can derive two contrasting sets of expectations for ethnic boundaries among the grandchildren of immigrants in Western Europe. We could first expect an intergenerational dynamic of assimilation, where ethnic boundaries between the 3rd generation and natives are "blurrier" than the boundaries between the 2nd generation and natives. Here, minority individuals can be part of different social worlds – that of the mainstream and that of their immigrant origin group – and simultaneously identify as members of a minority as well as the mainstream. In other words, when ethnic boundaries are blurry, identities and networks on either side of it are *non-zero-sum* (Alba 2005:25). A key ingredient of blurry boundaries are mixed unions: intermarriage at the 2nd generation should result in mixed networks and identities at the next (the 3rd) generation who grow up bridging differences between the immigrant and native social worlds (Alba, Beck, and Sahin 2017; Alba and Foner 2015b).

Conversely, we may expect "bright" ethnic boundaries at the 3rd generation, where networks and identities on each side are difficult to reconcile. Under bright boundaries, the

distinction between minority and majority groups is unambiguous and zero-sum. This implies that assimilation is costly for minority individuals and is likely to take the form of boundary crossing, i.e., resembling a conversion and entailing "growing distance from peers, feelings of disloyalty, and anxieties about acceptance" (Alba 2005:24). By and large, bright ethnic boundaries at the 3rd generation are the scenario expected within the "segmented assimilation" framework (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Gonzales 2019), whereby racial barriers channel immigrant families towards ethnically segregated social relations – at times even leading to a reaction of heightened awareness of, and attachment to, one's ethnic origins (Rumbaut 2008). Under bright ethnic boundaries, such ethnic attachment occurs at the detriment of identification with the nation and its majority group, which may be perceived as hostile (Rumbaut 2008:110). More generally, when ethnic boundaries are bright, we may expect sharply defined identities and ethnically segregated social networks.

In practice, we expect the 3rd generation will experience ethnic boundaries that are neither completely bright nor blurry, but rather somewhere in-between. Furthermore, ethnic boundaries among the descendants of immigrants are not one-size-fits-all: different groups may experience a different type of boundary. This heterogeneity was already prominent in Alba's (2005) account of ethnic boundaries for the 2nd generation in Western Europe. It is also paramount to the segmented assimilation perspective, which emphasizes different assimilation trajectories depending on the degree of racialization and exclusion different groups are subject to. In the Western European contexts, we may for example expect that "low-status" groups (due to their stigmatized ethnic, racial and/or religious origins, and typically originating outside Europe) tend to face brighter boundaries than European immigrant groups from Southern and Eastern Europe (Alba 2005; Alba and Holdaway 2013).

Research questions

Our goal is to offer a first step towards an assessment of ethnic boundaries – as they manifest in friendship networks and cultural identities two generations after the era of settlement – among adolescents across multiple European countries. We are interested in answering the following research questions:

- **Native friendships (network inclusion)**: are members of the 3rd generation as likely to have friendships with natives as other natives are (and does the 3rd generation close the gap in inclusion relative to the 2nd generation)?
- **National identification**: do members of the 3rd generation identify as strongly with their country of residence as the native population (and does the 3rd generation close the gap in identification compared to the 2nd generation)?

We are simultaneously interested in whether any increases in inclusion within native networks and increases in national identity occur without the loss of ethnic networks and identity, or alternatively whether inclusion in native networks occurs simultaneously with weakening connections to the ethnic origin group. When the former is the case, this suggests an overall blurring of ethnic boundaries, whereas the latter suggests boundary crossing over a persistently bright boundary.

- **Co-ethnic friendships**: are members of the 3rd generation as likely to have co-ethnic friendships as members of the 2nd generation?
- **Ethnic identification**: does ethnic identification weaken among members of the 3rd generation compared to the 2nd generation?

Finally, we are interested in understanding whether boundaries in later generations occur consistently across ethnic origins. We differentiate between major origin groups, and pay particular attention to ethnic boundaries among origin groups deemed 'low status' due to stigmatized ethnic, racial and religious differences (Alba et al. 2011). In practice, this often means differentiating between European and non-European origin immigrant groups, although the exact groupings vary across Western European destination contexts.

Data, measurements and modelling approach

The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey

Our analysis uses the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey of Four European Countries or CILS4EU (Kalter et al. 2016), which began in the 2010–2011 school year, during which researchers conducted stratified random sampling of schools by geographic region, school type, school size, and oversampled pupils with a migration background. Within selected schools, researchers randomly selected two classrooms of 14-year-old students and surveyed all students within these classrooms. The overall response rate among students was approximately 85%.

The CILS4EU survey was designed to study immigrant-origin youth in four European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, England, and Sweden). Its oversampling of schools with many immigrant-origin students ensures sufficient variation across immigrant backgrounds and generations. The extent of its coverage and the quality of its instruments make the CILS4EU one of the foremost data sources on the descendants of immigrants. We focus on the German, Dutch, and English samples of the CILS4EU (and exclude the Swedish sample due to small numbers in later generation).[4] We study all native respondents (i.e., those with no discernable migration history) and all 2nd- and 3rd-generation immigrant respondents whose origins can be traced to the major ethnic groups in each survey country (described in Table 1, below). This includes 1,811, 935 and 885 immigrant-origin respondents as well as 2,111, 2,539, and 1,966 4th-plus native respondents in the German, Dutch, and English samples, respectively.

Measurement of immigrant generation and ethnic origins

The primary purpose of our analyses is to compare assimilation dynamics among the grandchildren of immigrants (3rd generation) with that of the children of immigrants in Western Europe (2nd generation) on the one hand, and with those without a migration background on the other hand. The children of immigrants are born in their country of residence but have at least one foreign-born parent. The grandchildren of immigrants are not only born in their country of residence, they also have at least one 2nd generation parent and at least one foreign-born grandparent.

Empirically, we identify and separately analyze students who have both native and immigrant-origin parentage (Emonds and Van Tubergen 2015). The mixed 2nd generation has one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent. The native-born parent may be a child of an immigrant him or herself (Dollman and Jacob 2016), although we do not further

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[4] Note that the data on the United Kingdom that we use is restricted to England. The data on Germany excludes Bavaria (see (Kalter et al. 2016) for detail on CILS4EU fieldwork and study design).

distinguish among these categories within the mixed 2nd generation for reasons of statistical power. This group comprises around a quarter of the immigrant-origin sample and straddles the line between the children and the grandchildren of immigrants. Yet their experiences may be distinct from both, and thus we regard them as categorically distinct. Importantly, we cannot separately consider the mixed and unmixed 3rd generation due to data limitations (i.e., small numbers among the unmixed 3rd generation). Among the 3rd generation across our three countries under study, 13.5% have four foreign-born grandparents, 3.9% have three foreign-born grandparents, 25.8% have two foreign-born grandparents, and 56% have just one foreign-born grandparent (unweighted frequencies).[5]

Table 1 provides definitions of each generation and describes the sample using weighted and unweighted numbers of respondents in each generation.[6]

[Table 1 About Here]

To define ethnic background among immigrant-origin students, we use ancestral country of birth. Most cases were unambiguous (for over 89%, 92%, and 90% of immigrant-origin respondents in the German, Dutch, and English samples, respectively, all non-native ancestors of respondents shared the same ancestral country of birth).[7] Thus we follow the convention of prioritizing maternal country of birth in defining a respondent's background (Dollmann, Jacob, and Kalter 2014).[8] Importantly, most immigrants with non-native ancestors of different origins (mixed-minority origins) were members of the 2nd generation – later generations are predominantly of mixed-generational status rather than of mixed-minority origins. This aspect motivates our empirical approach to mixedness.

Overall, we treat each country of origin as a separate ethnic group whenever possible but combine some ethnic groups due to smaller sample sizes for some groups (we comment on any implications for interpretation in the main results). In Germany, the largest ethnic categories were Turkish and Russian/Polish. In the Netherlands, the largest categories were Turkish/Moroccan and Surinamese. In England, the largest categories were Indian/Pakistani and Jamaican. We compare the generational patterns of "low-status" non-European origin

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[5] We do not separate the 3rd generation based on number of immigrant grandparents due to small sample sizes, especially for analyses that also differentiate by ethnicity. This implies that any cross-national differences we observe could be due to differences in intermarriage among the grandparents of the 3rd generation (mixedness in the 3rd generation). In Netherlands (and in Germany to some extent), most 3rd generation respondents have just 1 or 2 immigrant grandparents, while in England, most have 3 or 4 immigrant grandparents. Sensitivity analyses that removed those with just 1 immigrant grandparent led to substantively similar results with one exception: in the Netherlands it led to stronger co-ethnic friendships and ethnic identities (without changes to ties to natives and national identities), suggesting that in the Dutch case, the experiences of boundary crossing (as seen in the main analyses) versus boundary blurring at the 3rd generation depends on mixedness among their grandparents.
[6] Survey weights at the student level account for nonresponse and differential probability of being sampled. All regression analyses will use survey weights. Results were insensitive to the choice of whether or not to weight.
[7] Mixed-minority respondents were rather uncommon among groups designated as ethnically Jamaican in England, Turkish in German, and Turkish/Moroccan in the Netherlands (around 3-4%). To address whether results are driven by the intersection of generational- and dual-minority- mixedness, we conduct sensitivity tests that flag mixed-minority students in adjusted models. Results were substantively similar.
[8] When a 2nd or 3rd generation respondent's ancestry involve multiple immigrant origins, maternal country of birth defines ethnic background. For example, a 3rd generation respondent, who has two German grandfathers, a Turkish grandmother, and a Russian grandfather, would be coded as Turkish origin (however such cases of mixed-minority ethnic origin were rare).

groups with that of those of European origins, who serve as a reference category.[9] Table 1 summarizes the number of respondents that fall into each generation for each ethnic group.

Measurement of ethnic boundaries and assimilation outcomes

To study ethnic boundaries in social networks, we analyze acceptance in the social networks of natives. The CILS4EU is commonly used to study segregation in classroom friendships between natives and immigrants (Kruse and Kroneberg 2019; Smith et al. 2016) but has not yet addressed whether and to what extent the native population shares ties with the 3rd generation. To do so, we use the friendship module in which respondents are asked to nominate up to five best friends,[10] and then to select their friend's ethnic or racial background from a list of the most common ethnic or racial categories (in the Netherlands this included the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean, and Dutch categories; in Germany this included the Turkish, Russian, Polish, Italian, and German categories; in England this included the Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British, and White British categories).

First, we analyze whether respondents list at least one "native" as a best friend. Natives are members of the ethnic majority (e.g., those with fully Dutch ancestry in the Netherlands, or White British ancestry in England). Second, we analyze whether respondents list at least one co-ethnic best friend. Note that while we present combined results from some ethnic categories (e.g., Turkish and Moroccan), this does not have to do with whether a friendship is considered co-ethnic. Co-ethnic students share a *specific* country of origin for the Dutch and German context (e.g., a Turkish-Moroccan friendship is *not* considered co-ethnic in the Netherlands). In the English context, a Pakistani-Indian friendship is however considered co-ethnic as they would be classified as Asian British in the data on co-ethnic friendships in England.[11]

To study ethnic boundaries in terms of cultural identities, we analyze the subjective experience of national and ethnic identification among the immigrant-origin students. National and ethnic identifications were measured using responses to the questions: "How strongly do you feel [a member of survey country]?[12] and "How strongly do you feel [a member of ethnic group]," respectively.[13] The range of responses for both questions were: "very strongly," "fairly strongly," "not very strongly," and "not at all strongly," which we transform to a 4-point scale.

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[9] A limitation of aggregation is that the exact composition of this European immigrant category may differ across generations. In Germany, this group consists primarily of immigrants from the Former Yugoslavia in the 2nd generation, and from Italy and other parts of Southern or Eastern Europe in later generations. However, in England and in the Netherlands, the dominant subcategory of European immigrants is of Irish and German descent, respectively, and this holds across immigrant generations.

[10] Best friend nominations are not limited to classmates, allowing us to create comparable measures of ties to natives and ties to co-ethnics (we cannot use the classroom friendships to study co-ethnics ties since immigrants were often the only individual of their ethnicity in their classroom). In sensitivity analyses, we use the classroom friendship module analyze network inclusion via incoming ties from natives. Here, the gap in network inclusion at the 2nd and 3rd generation remains robust, though there were some differences in the results for the mixed 2nd generation (Appendix Figure A-1), where standard errors were larger in the models that also differentiate by ethnic origins (Appendix Figure A-2).

[11] Ethnic and racial categories in questionnaires were determined by the survey teams for the respective countries, i.e., the "Asian British" category is part of the questionnaire for the England-based survey.

[12] German in the German survey, Dutch in the Dutch survey, and British in the English survey.

[13] Respondents were first asked to tick all items they identified with (e.g., Morocco, Jamaica, Pakistan, Turkey, etc.). If multiple items were checked, subsequent questions on ethnic identification refer to respondents' strongest ethnic identity.

Analytic strategy

Our analyses aim to take stock of the dynamics of intergenerational assimilation across two main domains (networks and identities), and among multiple ethnic groups and residence countries. Within each residence country, we first separately predict each outcome, using logistic regressions to model outcomes that are binary (network outcomes) and using ordinary least square regressions to model outcomes that are on a continuous scale (identification outcomes).[14] In most of the analyses, we use the full analytic sample. In the analyses of co-ethnic networks, we use only major immigrant groups for which co-ethnic best friendships were measured.[15] All analyses use survey weights at the student level that account for nonresponse and differential probability of being sampled, though results were not sensitive to the choice of whether or not to weight.

We structure our empirical analyses by taking a comparative look at two categorical distinctions to examine variation in ethnic boundaries in our population of interest – generational differences and ethnic origin differences. Thus, in the first set of the analyses, the main covariate is generational status (which differentiates between the 2nd, mixed 2nd, 3rd, and the 4+ generation) to examine generational differences expected under assimilation theory. In a second set of analyses, we pay close attention to segmentation by ethnic origins (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Gonzales 2019) to describe potential exceptions to broad generational patterns. This is useful because some ethnic groups may be over-represented among some generations and especially among the mixed generations (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006; Kulu and Hannemann 2018). To do so, we define a separate category for each combination of ethnic origin and immigrant generation to allow the possibility of different generational patterns across ethnic groups.

Across our analyses of friendship ties and identification patterns, we specify a baseline, unadjusted model and an adjusted model. Diversity and segregation in friendship ties and identification patterns are both affected by sociodemographic factors, such as parental socioeconomic status and related patterns of spatial segregation shaping opportunities for friendship (Kruse et al. 2016; Mouw and Entwisle 2006) and religious affiliation (Maxwell and Bleich 2014). These sociodemographic factors may themselves vary across generations and confound generational differences in our outcomes. Thus, we also control for socioeconomic status (as proxied by parental occupational status), religious affiliation[16], and exposure to natives within classrooms and neighborhoods[17] in our second (adjusted) model specification. We also control for gender in this second specification. Together, the base and adjusted models help describe and assess whether there is a dominant trend of assimilation over generations and degrees of parental mixedness, and whether such change are mediated by intergenerational difference on other dimensions captured by our controls and expressed by the difference across the two specifications. We describe our

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[14] Models that use ordinal logistic regressions led to substantively similar results (results available on request).
[15] This includes the Turkish, Polish and Russian ethnic groups in Germany, the Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese groups in the Netherlands, and the Indian, Pakistani, and Jamaican groups in England.
[16] We rely on a survey question that asks respondents about their religious affiliation. We distinguish between Christian, Islamic, nonreligious, and "other" religious respondents.
[17] Classroom exposure to natives is defined as the percent of natives classmates. Neighborhood exposure to natives is proxied using perceived exposure on a 5-point scale. These controls are especially important in the analyses of networks since ties are constrained by sorting and segregation across schools. While differentiating between sorting and preferences is beyond the scope of our analyses, adjusted models nevertheless help assess generational differences in networks outcomes after introducing proxies for opportunity structure.

sample, separately by country of residence and generation, with respect to all outcomes and control covariates in Appendix Table A-1.

Our analyses revolve around several target quantities of interest (Lundberg, Johnson, and Stewart 2021) that depend on the specific outcome. For coethnic networks and ethnic identification, we are primarily interested in whether the 3rd generation differs from the 2nd generation. Thus, we make comparisons using the 2nd generation as the reference category in our logistic regression models. For network inclusion and national identification, we are interested in the gap between each immigrant generation and the native 4+ generation, which we estimate by using natives as the reference category in OLS regression models.[18] In these analyses, we are further interested in knowing whether and to what extent the coefficient for each later generation (such as the 3rd generation) is statistically different from the coefficient for the 2nd generation, which we test using a Paternoster test for coefficient equality (Paternoster et al. 1998). This tells us whether the grandchildren of immigrants are more similar to natives than the children of immigrants are to natives. In other words, this last quantity tests for the difference between two differences, namely second-generation vis-à-vis natives on one hand and third-generation vis-à-vis natives on the other hand.

Results

Ethnic boundaries in social networks

We first analyze the network incorporation of the 3rd generation using ties to natives. Specifically, we consider how likely respondents in our sample are to name at least one "native" (i.e., 4+ generation) best friend. Figure 1 describes the predicted probability of having at least one native best friend for each immigrant generation based on separate logistic regression models for each country of residence.

[Figure 1 About Here]

The baseline models (solid bars) consider whether individuals are members of the 2nd (red bar), mixed 2nd (purple bar), 3rd (blue bar) or native generation (gray bar). The adjusted models (dashed bars) also control for covariates such as gender, parental socioeconomic status, religion, and exposure to natives in classrooms and neighborhoods. Table A-2 reports the models and regressions on which Figure 1 is based.

The base (unadjusted) models in Figure 1 show that on average, only 72%, 68%, and 51% of 2nd generation respondents name a native best friend in the German, Dutch, and English samples, respectively. In contrast, in the 3rd generation, as much as 99%, 99%, and 91% of 3rd generation respondents name a native best friend. For reference, native students almost always name a native best friend. Visual inspection of the first-order differences in Figure 1 shows that despite a few distinct patterns in each country, the baseline propensity to have best friendships with natives is higher in the 3rd generation than in the 2nd generation. In fact, the propensity in the 3rd generation more closely resembles that of the native population.

The adjusted models show that in England and in the Netherlands, the generational gaps reflect compositional differences in parental SES and exposure to natives – especially proportion native in classrooms (see Table A-2 for the results of the full model and tests of

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[18] Such a comparison is not possible for the co-ethnic networks outcome, which is not defined for natives.

coefficient equality for the 2nd and 3rd generation). However, in Germany, the pattern of increasing network inclusion in the 3rd generation persists even after accounting for how generations differ on compositional differences and classroom exposure to natives. In the German case, the 2nd generation is less likely to hold ties to natives (than natives are to hold ties to other natives). In contrast, the 3rd generation closes this gap, and the second-order difference between 2nd and 3rd generation respondents in these coefficients are statistically significant.

There are only a few exceptions to these overall trends in network inclusion when we consider differences by ethnic origin. Figure 2 summarizes predicted probabilities of nominating at least one native best friend for each combination of immigrant generation and ethnic origin (based on regressions in Table A-3).

[Figure 2 About Here]

The results in Figure 2 show that for most ethnic groups, the 3rd generation is significantly more likely to hold native best friendships than their 2nd generation counterparts (even after adjusting for controls). For example, we observe this positive trend among those of Indian- and Pakistani- origin in England, among those of Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Surinamese- origin in the Netherlands, and among immigrants of European-origin in England and Germany.[19] Among these groups, the predicted chances of holding ties to natives in the 2nd generation ranges from under 50% to approximately 80%. In contrast, the predicted chances of holding ties to natives in the 3rd generation are close to 100%. As Figure 2 shows, this difference in predicted probabilities is statistically significant. There are also statistically significant differences between the coefficients for the 2nd generation and the 3rd generation for the relevant groups in the models on which Figure 2 is based (Table A-3). The overall pattern we document so far is thus one of increasing probability of native-immigrant ties across generations.

However, there are two noteworthy exceptions to this trend – the Turkish-origin in Germany and the Jamaican-origin in England. Among these groups, the 3rd generation is predicted to hold ties to natives at just below and above 80% chances, respectively, which is higher that the predicted chances of holding ties to natives at the 2nd generation in base models (solid lines in Figure 2), but not adjusted models (solid lines in Figure 2). In other words, in most groups, the tendency of stronger network inclusion in later generations goes beyond the extent we would expect based on compositional change across generation, yet this is not the case for the Turkish-origin and Jamaican-origin students in Germany and England, respectively. While we cannot elucidate this further, it could be theoretically due to relatively smaller sample sizes or stronger ethnic homophily net of opportunity structure for interethnic friendships. Either way, there is ethnic heterogeneity in the extent of evidence supporting greater network inclusion in the 3rd generation.

Finally, we note that there is some heterogeneity in ties to natives among the mixed 2nd generation across countries and ethnic origins. Among most ethnic groups, the networks of the mixed 2nd generation fall somewhere between that of the 2nd and 3rd generation, with two exceptions. First, among the Turkish-origin in Germany, the mixed 2nd generation does not close the gap in network inclusion relative to the 2nd generation after adjusting for

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[19] Note that these patterns do not hold in the case of "Other European" origin in the Netherlands and in England because of high levels of network inclusion already in the 2nd generation, especially in adjusted models.

covariates, which differs from the other groups under study. Second, in groups that display larger generational differences in levels of network inclusion (e.g., among European-origin immigrants as well as among the Dutch Surinamese), the mixed 2nd generation already resembles the 3rd generation in having a high propensity for ties to natives.

These nuances across destination countries and origin groups notwithstanding, such results are broadly in line with expectations from assimilation theory: the 3rd generation is more likely than its 2nd generation counterpart to nominate natives as best friends, and much of such cross-generational difference reflects different endowments in the resources allowing for network integration in the first place (e.g., higher parental SES). Moreover, the 3rd generation is hardly different from natives when it comes to network integration, and effectively experiences a blending dynamic.

Friendship ties with co-ethnics

Friendships with co-ethnics is another, complementary aspect of networks that also helps capture the strength of ethnic boundaries. Figure 3 describes the predicted probabilities of naming at least one co-ethnic best friend (please see Table A-4 for the models on which Figure 3 is based) among the subset of the sample for which co-ethnic networks are defined.

[Figure 3 About Here]

The baseline models in Figure 3 shows that 69%, 71%, and 88% of 2nd generation respondents are predicted to have a co-ethnic best friend in the German, Dutch, and English samples, respectively. In contrast, only 14%, 5.6%, and 54% of 3rd generation respondents have a co-ethnic best friend in these three countries. Thus, for all three countries, co-ethnic friendships are less likely in the 3rd generation compared to the 2nd (the English case stands out with higher chances of co-ethnic friendships overall, which is likely related to the measurement of friendships using racial categories in the English survey).

For each country of residence and in each immigrant generation, there are significantly lower chances of co-ethnic best friendships in the 3rd generation (blue bars) compared to the 2nd generation (red bars). Adjusted models show that the drop in co-ethnic friendships in the 3rd generation is not explained by generational differences in factors such as parental SES, neighborhood composition, and classroom composition in Germany and the Netherlands. Turning to the mixed 2nd generation (purple bars), we see that chances of co-ethnic ties for the mixed 2nd generation fall somewhere between chances of co-ethnic ties for the 2nd and 3rd generation. These estimates do not statistically differ from the 2nd generation after adjusting for covariates. Overall, we note that cross-generational differences are marked in the German and Dutch case.[20] In England, there are elevated probabilities to maintain friendship ties within racial groups even by the 3rd generation.[21]

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[20] While 95% CI on predictions slightly overlap in the Dutch case (Figure 3), the difference between the 3rd and 2nd generation is statistically significant (Appendix Table A-4)

[21] Large standard errors on predicted probabilities of coethnic friendships in the Dutch 2nd generation and same-racial friendships in the English case are due to smaller sample sizes along with the choice to predict the outcome holding the religious affiliation variable to "no religion" (i.e., if all immigrants were to have the modal religious affiliation of their destination country as a whole). Since religion is very important for coethnic friendships (Appendix Table A-4) and there are few non-religious individuals in these generations and in these countries (Appendix Table A-1), this rendered estimates imprecise. Holding religious affiliation to other values led to similar issues for other generational categories.

Figure 4 describes generational patterns of co-ethnic ties by ethnic origins among the ethnic groups for which co-ethnic friendships were measured in the survey (see Table A-5 for the models on which Figure 4 is based as well as relevant significance tests). Overall and at baseline, co-ethnic friendships are less common in the 3rd generation compared to the 2nd generation across ethnic groups. In the Netherlands, the 3rd generation is significantly less likely to have co-ethnic friendships compared to the 2nd generation among both the Turkish/Moroccan origin and the Surinamese origin. In Germany, co-ethnic friendships for 3rd generation immigrants of Russian and Polish origin are significantly less likely than for their 2nd generation counterparts, even in adjusted models. However, among the Turkish-origin in Germany, the Turkish and Morrocan-origin in the Netherlands, and the Indian/Pakistani- and Jamaican-origin in England, lower chances of ties to co-ethnics in the 3rd generation (compared to the 2nd generation) largely reflect compositional differences in SES and especially classroom exposure to natives.

[Figure 4 About Here]

Overall, results do not support the idea that immigrant-origin 3rd generation adolescents are on both sides of blurred ethnic boundaries, but rather that they "cross" over into the mainstream when it comes to network ties. In addition, the extent of boundary crossing in later generations exceeds what we would expect based on compositional differences across generations. For most ethnic groups in our study, the 3rd generation is significantly more likely to hold ties to natives and less likely to hold ties to co-ethnics than their 2nd generation counterparts. However, for the Turkish-origin in Germany, we note a different pattern of cross-generational stability in the probability for both native and co-ethnic friendships, which suggests bright network boundaries.

Finally, there were a few mixed 2nd generation ethnic groups whose networks are best characterized by boundary blurring: among the India/Pakistan origin in England and the Turkey/Morocco group in the Netherland, the mixed 2nd generation is significantly more likely to hold ties to natives than their (unmixed) 2nd generation counterparts while simultaneously maintaining co-ethnic networks. These results evoke non-zero-sum patterns of friendship ties, and are consistent with the significance of mixed unions in reflecting much of the expansion of the "mainstream" and the blurring of ethnic boundaries among children of mixed descent (Alba et al. 2017; Alba and Foner 2015a).

National identification

Our results reveal intergenerational progress, but also gaps in national identification between the immigrant-origin and native groups that remain across generations. Figure 5 shows how strongly each immigrant generation identifies with their country of residence based on OLS regression models predicting identification on a four-point scale, where higher values represent identifying more strongly with countries of residence (models and relevant significance tests are reported in Table A-6). In all three countries we study, there is a large gap in national identification between the 2nd generation (red bars) and natives (gray bars).

[Figure 5 About Here]

In Germany and in the Netherlands, the 3rd generation (blue bars) is closer to natives but does not completely close the gap in identification. In these countries, while the grandchildren of immigrants identify more strongly with their country of residence than 2nd generation, they

generally still do not identify as strongly with their countries of residence as the native population does. These patterns hold in both baseline (solid bars) and adjusted models (dashed bars), although in Germany it is worth nothing that identification at the 2nd generation greatly increases once compositional factors are controlled for. In England, although there is a smaller gap in identification between the 2nd generation and the native population than in the other countries, the 3rd generation shows little difference in national identification compared to their 2nd generation counterparts, evoking a pattern of blocked assimilation.[22]

The experiences of the mixed 2nd generation (which is comprised of individuals with one foreign-born parent and one parent who is native-born but is the child of at least one immigrant) is heterogeneous and depends on the resident country. In England, the mixed 2nd generation has relatively similar levels of national identification as both the unmixed 2nd and 3rd generation. In Germany and in the Netherlands, the national identification of the mixed 2nd generation falls somewhere between the identification of the 2nd and 3rd generation. These patterns again support the idea of mixed unions as a hallmark of changes to ethnic boundaries among the children and grandchildren of immigrants.

Whether or not the 3rd generation closes the gap in national identification relative to the 2nd generation depends on both ethnic origin and country of residence. Figure 6 describes predicted levels of national identification by ethnic origin across ethnic groups (models and relevant significance tests are reported in Table A-7).

[Figure 6 About Here]

Levels of national identification are similar in the 3rd generation, mixed 2nd, and 2nd generation among the Turkish-origin in Germany as well as among the Indian/Pakistani- and Jamaican-origin in England to some extent. Among these groups, the gap in national identification with natives appears stagnant across immigrant generations. While the failure to reject the null here should not lead to the conclusion of no generational difference in national identities among these groups (more research with a larger sample is needed), tendencies are already visible in our sample. Altogether, we note ethnic heterogeneity in the extent of evidence supporting greater national identification in the 3rd generation. For example, in Germany, the average native respondent's identification feels relatively close to "very strongly" German, whereas the average Turkish-origin respondent's identification falls between "not very strongly" and "fairly strongly" across all three generations. In England, the average Jamaican-origin respondent England falls just below feeling "fairly strongly" British, but this does not change much in the three generations of Jamaican-origin respondents in England, while native students feel close to "very strongly" British.

In contrast, those of European origin (e.g., Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, etc.) have significantly higher levels of identification with their countries of residence in the 3rd generation than in the 2nd generation in all three destination countries. In other words, they progressively close the gap in national identification with natives in later generations. This

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[22] Tests in brackets in Table A-6 show that the difference in the coefficients on the 2nd generation and on the 3rd generation is not statistically significant in England (so we do not have evidence to support the idea that the gap in national identification between natives and immigrants shrinks in later generations). While we interpret non-significance in the gap in identification between the 3rd generation and the 2nd generation with caution due to small sample sizes, relatively small confidence intervals in Figure 5 as well as the magnitudes of the coefficients and corresponding predictions lend further support to our interpretation of results.

also holds for major immigrant groups of non-European origin in the Netherlands: here, the 3rd generation tends to feel as much (or almost as much) of a member of their country of residence as the native population does. Hence, whilst considering ethnic origins, changes in identification patterns across generations appear to vary across national contexts: they resemble a linear assimilation dynamic in the Netherlands but are closer to persistently bright boundaries in England and especially in Germany, with fewer intergenerational differences at the 3rd generation among "low-status" origin groups (Alba and Holdaway 2013).

Ethnic identification

Figure 7 summarizes how strongly each generation identifies with their ethnic origins measured on a 5-point scale, where higher levels represent stronger identification and a level of 0 represents no ethnic identification.[23] Models and regressions on which Figure 7 is based are given in Table A-8.

[Figure 7 About Here]

In each country, levels of co-ethnic identification are low in the 3rd generation (blue bars), middling in the mixed 2nd generation (purple bars), and highest in the 2nd generation (red bars). Among the 4+ generation (gray bars), levels of ethnic identification are close to but slightly above zero, indicating that few among the native population identify with an ethnic group other than the native majority group.

In addition to the overall trends of weakened ethnic identification across generations, two other trends stand out. First, the baseline patterns we observe (solid bars) are robust to the inclusion of control covariates (dashed bars). This suggests that cross-generational differences in ethnic identification do not simply reflect differences in social resources or religious orientation across generations. Second, we note cross-country variation: while there are strong assimilatory trends in Germany and the Netherlands in terms of weakened ethnic identification in later generations, levels of ethnic identification are of middling strength in all three generations in England. This is especially true when adjusting for covariates such as SES and religion.

Figure 8 summarizes generational differences in ethnic identification by ethnic origin (models and relevant significance tests are reported in Table A-9). In Germany, the tendency of weakened ethnic identification in the 3rd generation appears among immigrants of European origin, but not Turkish origin. In contrast, for all ethnic groups studied in the Dutch context, ethnic identification is weaker in the mixed 2nd generation and 3rd generation relative to the 2nd generation. This pattern of linear assimilation also holds once we adjust for relevant covariates. By contrast, generational patterns in the strength of ethnic identification do not show weakening ethnic identification in later generations among major ethnic groups in England, such as the Indian/Pakistani-origin and Jamaican- origin. In fact, after adjusting for differences in SES, religion, and exposure to natives across generations, 3rd generation individuals from those ethnic groups identify *more* strongly with their ethnic origins than their 2nd generation counterparts (though these differences are not statistically significant among the Indian/Pakistani-origin).

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[23] In sensitivity analyses that define ethnic identification on a four- instead of five-point scale (dropping those who do not identify with an ethnic minority group), results are overall similar, although the Dutch case stands out even more strongly (Appendix Figure A-3 and Figure A-4).

[Figure 8 About Here]

Comparisons of national and ethnic identification between the 3rd and 2nd generations underscore context-specific patterns in the salience of ethnic boundaries. Among the 3rd generation in the Netherlands, the 3rd generation of Russian/Polish origin in Germany as well as the 3rd generation of other European origin in Germany and England, we observe what resembles a zero-sum relationship between *increasingly stronger* national and *increasingly weaker* ethnic identification compared to the 2nd generation. These patterns are consistent with the idea of boundary crossing across a bright boundary, whereby simultaneous belonging in social worlds of the native and immigrant groups is difficult (Alba 2005:24). However, among the 3rd generation of Turkish origin in Germany and of Indian/Pakistani and Jamaican origin in England, we note that neither national nor ethnic identification changes much across generation. In particular, national identification remains low while ethnic identification remains at elevated albeit not high levels across generations, evoking bright boundaries in the German case.

Discussion and conclusion

While migration scholars have long considered the 3rd generation a litmus test of assimilation, there are to date only a few empirical studies on the "new" 3rd generation – and fewer, still, that do not exclusively focus on socioeconomic attainment. Here, we have studied ethnic boundaries in networks and identities among the new 3rd generation in Western Europe. Specifically, we have analyzed a dataset of young adolescents in three Western European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, and England) to offer a glimpse at differences in the assimilation of the 3rd as compared to the 2nd generation.

Four core dynamics emerge from our analyses. First, we observe increased network inclusion within natives' friendship networks among 3rd generation adolescents compared to their 2nd generation counterparts. In the 3rd generation, immigrant-native friendship ties are very common, and native-immigrant friendship segregation nearly disappears. For the most part, this increase in network inclusion comes alongside weakened co-ethnic ties, as compared to the 2nd generation. This speaks to a version of assimilation – defined as the "decline of an ethnic distinction" over generations (Alba and Nee 2003: 11) – that involves "boundary crossing" by the 3rd generation into the mainstream. For the Turkish-origin in Germany and the Jamaican-origin in England, expanded ties to natives and diminished ties to co-ethnics in the 3rd generation are more ambiguous and are accounted for by change in sociodemographics influencing tie formation across generation. Yet for the other ethnic groups, patterns of boundary crossing in later generations are robust to sociodemographic differences across generations. Overall, our results certainly do not support the idea that immigrant-origin 3rd generation adolescents straddle ethnic boundaries by keeping one foot in each social world (Wimmer 2013:7–10). Rather, our findings show attachments to social worlds that appear zero-sum: the grandchildren of immigrants enter mainstream networks while simultaneously retreating from ties with their ethnic origin group.

Second, we document a dominant trend of assimilation in the form of boundary crossing when it comes to cultural identities, albeit a more nuanced one than in the case of networks. In terms of broad differences across generations and in some ethnic groups, we see a classic assimilation trend of increasing national identification and decreasing ethnic identification across generation. Yet in other cases, such as among the largest immigrant groups in England, as well as Turkish-origin adolescents Germany, we observe that neither

national nor ethnic identifications differ much between the 2nd and 3rd generations. In conjunction with above results, this implies that 3rd-generation adolescents from these groups do not convert increased network inclusion into associated trends in identification (i.e., higher national identification and lower ethnic identification). Past research has linked ethnic homophily to patterns of ethnic (Leszczensky and Pink 2019) and national identification (Kruse and Kroneberg 2019) – albeit with a cautious interpretation of a causal relationship between identification and friendship. Yet our findings suggest a decoupling between networks and identification not clearly foreseen in theories of ethnic boundary formation (Alba 2005; Wimmer 2013). Relatively stagnant generational patterns of identities despite network inclusion at the 3rd generation among some origin groups are noteworthy and warrant further research.

Third, and relatedly, generational differences in assimilation vary by origin groups and destination countries. The Dutch case stands out as a clear story of boundary crossing at the 3rd generation, with relatively comparable patterns across ethnic minorities. We speculate this Dutch exception may be due to the strength of the well-documented "integration discourse" that has permeated Dutch society since the late 1990s – starting around or before when most of our respondents would have been born (Slootman and Duyvendak 2015). Indeed, the strong assimilatory demands on ethnic minorities as a part of this discourse could have later resulted patterns of de-ethnicized networks and identities such as what we uncovered. Such a discourse, however, does not explain high rates of ancestral mixedness at the grandparental generation in the Netherlands, which may also be an important ingredient in the assimilation trend in that national context. In Germany, we observe bifurcated or segmented patterns of blocked assimilation in terms of national and ethnic identity for the Turkish-origin 3rd generation, in contrast to clearer patterns of weakening ethnic identification across generations among the Russian-/Polish- and other Europe-origin groups. Meanwhile, the English case stands out due to moderate levels of both national and ethnic identification at the 2nd generation (which suggests initially blurrier boundaries than in the other countries), but few differences across generations, which contradicts an assimilation story. One avenue to shed light on blocked assimilation patterns may lie in the study of discrimination and the disaffiliation from the mainstream it may engender - as theorized in the rejection-identification model in the case of African-Americans, for instance (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999). Our attempts to unpack these patterns were limited by data constraints, such as the excessively generic questions on feelings of discrimination.

Fourth, we identify a gradient in terms of mixed descent for several outcomes (Alba and Foner 2015a). The mixed 2nd generation is of particular interest because they are both the children of immigrants and native populations, and may thus straddle the line between different social worlds. This generation is in-between the 2nd and 3rd generation in terms of their networks and identification patterns. Our results do not suggest that mixedness is associated with blurry boundaries, and an ability for dual belonging as surmised by Alba and colleagues (Alba 2005, Alba, Beck and Sahin 2017, Alba and Foner 2015a). Instead, we locate the mixed 2nd generation at an earlier stage of the same process of boundary crossing as the 3rd generation (Kalmijn 2015). Due to limited statistical power in the current study, future studies are needed to understand the role of mixedness in the 3rd generation. While our results are only a first step towards understanding assimilation among mixed and later generations, mixed (native-immigrant) unions appear endogenous to a larger process of intergenerational boundary crossing – *not* boundary blurring (Alba 2005, Alba et al. 2017). Nevertheless, more research is needed regarding the significance of mixed ancestry at the third generation. Future work should aim at better understanding how immigrant origins

matter in the subjective experience of belonging and networks, especially among those with only one immigrant grandparent.

This study is not without limitations. Our synthetic generations approach comparing the contemporaneous 2nd and 3rd generation (rather than comparing 2nd generation parents with their 3rd generation children) warrants further discussion. The generational differences we document represent the total of not only assimilation-related changes between parents and children, but also differences in cohort since individuals making up our samples are off similar age. Thus, we cannot by design disentangle these cohort effects from the assimilation occurring through intergenerational change. In addition, while the adolescent population is chosen strategically here to be able to assess social inclusion and identification of the 3rd generation in Europe, our results require confirmation among adult respondents. During adolescence, peer influence becomes increasingly important and social attitudes, identities, and friendships with natives are in flux (Zhao 2023).

Relatedly, and despite its unique breadth, the CILS4EU nevertheless features a rather limited subsample of 3rd generation individuals, and one that is over a decade old now. While it remains the best data source to study networks and identities among the grandchildren of immigrants to date, we point to the need for new data sources to tackle this research problem (Duncan and Trejo 2018; Tran 2018; Jiménez et al. 2018). Longitudinal data collection efforts that survey a broad range of assimilation outcomes among both 2nd generation adults and their 3rd generation children at a comparable age would be particularly desirable. A more feasible possibility in the near term is to simultaneously survey generations in a linked family design, whereby interviews take place with grandparents, parents and grandchildren from a same family. Registry data will also allow for efficient within-family linkages, but these types of data are not consistently available across European countries, and typically do not allow for the study of identity-related and relational aspects of assimilation.

In closing, we hope our results will help advance a holistic view of assimilation and ethnic boundaries in Western Europe – and one that can, in turn, help inform future demographic scholarship. As the 3rd generation reaches adulthood, it will be crucial to further analyze the linkages between structural, relational, and cultural domains – and to possibly revisit the causal relationships that are implicit in past research (Drouhot and Nee 2019, Schachter 2016, Drouhot 2023). For instance, while many of our results support the idea that variation in network inclusion and identification co-occur, patterns of blocked identification despite network inclusion in England and among the Turkish-origin in Germany clearly beg the question of such links. Much past theorizing on assimilation has implicitly assumed that larger processes of immigrant social mobility are converted into identification and belonging with natives (Gans 2007; Schachter 2016; Drouhot 2023). Future studies should explore the mechanisms involved in the (non)-conversion of attainment in certain domains (e.g., social networks, labor market positions) into blending dynamics within other domains (e.g., identity and belonging). This may well hold a key to understanding the processes by which immigrants, their children, and now grandchildren participate in expanding the circles of community in nation-states that have also become *de facto* migration societies.

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TABLE 1
Definition and Descriptions of Immigrant Generations

	2nd Gen	Mixed 2nd	3rd Gen	4+ Gen
<u>Definition</u>				
# Foreign-born parents	2	1	0	0
# Foreign-born grandparents	4	2-4	1-4	0
<u>Sample Composition</u>				
Germany - Ns	1,018	437	356	2,111
- (Freq.)	(56%)	(24%)	(20%)	----
- (Wgt Freq.)	(41%)	(26%)	(33%)	----
Ethnic Origin				
Turkey	588	143	28	----
Russia/Poland	183	71	112	----
Other Europe	247	223	216	----
Netherlands - Ns	532	227	176	2,539
- (Freq.)	(57%)	(24%)	(19%)	----
- (Wgt Freq.)	(32%)	(37%)	(31%)	----
Ethnic Origin				
Suriname	99	42	62	----
Turkey/Morocco	398	63	31	----
Other Europe	35	122	83	----
England - Ns	279	349	257	1,966
- (Freq.)	(32%)	(39%)	(29%)	----
- (Wgt Freq.)	(22%)	(45%)	(33%)	----
Ethnic Origin				
India/Pakistan	229	192	72	----
Jamaica	21	44	55	----
Other Europe	29	113	130	----

Notes: (1) Ns are unweighted; (2) Frequencies show the representation of each generation within the immigrant subsample; (3) Weighted frequencies account for survey design and nonresponse.

Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Nominating ≥ 1 Native (4+ Gen) Best Friends, by Generation and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted probabilities are based on estimates from separate logistic regressions for each country of residence using baseline and adjusted models reported in Table A-2; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted probabilities

Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Nominating ≥ 1 Native (4+ Gen) Best Friends, by Immigrant Generation, Ethnic Origin, and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted probabilities based on estimates from separate logistic regressions for each country of residence using baseline and adjusted models reported in Table A-3; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted probabilities

Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Nominating ≥ 1 Co-ethnic Best Friends, by Generation and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted probabilities are based on estimates from separate logistic regressions for each country of residence using baseline and adjusted models reported in Table A-4; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted probabilities

Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Nominating ≥ 1 Co-ethnic Best Friends, by Generation, Ethnic Origin, and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted probabilities are based on estimates from separate logistic regressions for each country of residence using baseline and adjusted models reported in Table A-5; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted probabilities

Figure 5. Strength of National Identification by Generation and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted strength of national identification – which is measured on a four-point scale where larger values indicate stronger national identification – based on estimates from separate OLS regression models for each country of residence, which are reported in Table A-6; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES status, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predictions following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted strength of national identification

Figure 6. Strength of National Identification by Immigrant Generation, Ethnic Origin, and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted strength of national identification – which is measured on a four-point scale where larger values indicate stronger national identification – based on estimates from separate OLS regression models for each country of residence, which are reported in Table A-7; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted strength of national identification

Figure 7. Strength of Ethnic Identification by Generation and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted strength of ethnic identification – which is measured on a five-point scale where a value of 0 indicates no ethnic identification and a value of 1-4 indicates strength of main ethnic minority identity, where larger values indicate stronger identification (2) Based on estimates from separate OLS regression models for each country of residence, which are reported in Table A-8; (3) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (4) Predictions following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (5) Bars are 95% CI on predicted strength of ethnic identification

Figure 8. Strength of Ethnic Identification by Immigrant Generation, Ethnic Origin, and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted strength of ethnic identification – which is measured on a five-point scale where a value of 0 indicates no ethnic identification and a value of 1-4 indicates strength of main ethnic minority identity, where larger values indicate stronger identification (2) Based on estimates from separate OLS regression models for each country of residence, which are reported in Table A-9; (3) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood and classroom exposure to natives; (4) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country; (5) Bars are 95% CI on predicted strength of ethnic identification

APPENDIX

TABLE A-1:
Sample Descriptives by Immigrant Generations

	2nd Gen	Mixed 2nd	3rd Gen	4+ Gen
Germany				
Ties to Natives	0.72	0.89	0.99	0.99
	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ties to Co-ethnics	0.69	0.51	0.14	
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.35)	
National Identification	2.63	3.04	3.50	3.71
	(0.95)	(0.94)	(0.72)	(0.58)
Ethnic Identification	2.22	1.50	0.72	0.21
	(1.70)	(1.61)	(1.14)	(0.78)
SES	38.13	47.71	55.27	52.35
	(17.41)	(19.95)	(20.11)	(19.72)
Religion				
None	0.06	0.12	0.16	0.19
Christianity	0.38	0.63	0.79	0.78
Islam	0.47	0.13	0.01	0.00
Other	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.02
Exposure to Natives				
Neighborhood	2.52	2.79	3.19	3.40
	(1.16)	(1.10)	(0.89)	(0.79)
Classroom	0.54	0.61	0.67	0.73
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Netherlands				
Ties to Natives	0.68	0.96	0.99	1.00
	(0.47)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Ties to Co-ethnics	0.71	0.35	0.05	
	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.23)	
National Identification	2.78	3.26	3.39	3.67
	(0.73)	(0.65)	(0.82)	(0.54)
Ethnic Identification	2.88	1.08	0.38	0.14
	(1.56)	(1.54)	(0.99)	(0.62)
SES	39.74	54.98	54.44	51.29
	(19.57)	(19.73)	(18.31)	(19.76)
Religion				
None	0.08	0.52	0.65	0.56
Christianity	0.13	0.28	0.20	0.39
Islam	0.61	0.09	0.01	0.00
Other	0.17	0.11	0.07	0.04
Exposure to Natives				
Neighborhood	2.43	2.93	3.29	3.23
	(1.22)	(1.13)	(1.03)	(1.21)

Classroom	0.62	0.78	0.80	0.87
	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.10)
England				
Ties to Natives	0.51	0.79	0.91	1.00
	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.04)
Ties to Co-ethnics	0.88	0.84	0.54	
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.50)	
National Identification	3.14	3.09	3.23	3.60
	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.67)	(0.60)
Ethnic Identification	2.21	1.56	1.37	0.07
	(1.70)	(1.66)	(1.62)	(0.47)
SES	50.8	53.94	60.65	53.5
	(23.45)	(20.62)	(19.1)	(21.77)
Religion				
None	0.07	0.23	0.34	0.56
Christianity	0.08	0.35	0.44	0.37
Islam	0.50	0.23	0.05	0.00
Other	0.29	0.16	0.14	0.02
Exposure to Natives				
Neighborhood	2.05	2.57	2.84	3.35
	(1.24)	(1.24)	(1.06)	(0.88)
Classroom	0.38	0.62	0.66	0.88
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.13)

Notes: (1) N = 3922, 3474, 2851 in the German, Dutch, and English surveys, respectively; (2) means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are weighted using weights that account for survey design and nonresponse

Table A-2
Ties to Natives by Immigrant Generation and Country of Residence

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted
Generation (ref: 4+)						
2nd Gen	-4.26***	-2.15***	-5.42***	-1.50*	-6.44***	-2.30
	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.72)	(0.53)	(0.67)
Mixed 2nd	-3.10***	-1.79***	-3.00***	-1.49*	-5.13***	-2.22
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.53)	(0.69)	(0.53)	(0.63)
3rd Gen	-0.72	-0.16	-1.12	-0.40	-4.17***	-2.09
	(0.53)	(0.55)	(1.04)	(1.12)	(0.57)	(0.65)
Parental SES		0.02***		0.02		0.02*
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Gender (ref: girl)		-0.09		-0.17		0.36
		(0.19)		(0.36)		(0.30)
Religion (ref: none)						
Christian		-0.03		0.07		-0.79
		(0.40)		(0.77)		(0.61)
Islamic		-1.44***		-3.10***		-3.07***
		(0.41)		(0.68)		(0.61)
Other		-0.45		-0.62		-1.65**
		(0.51)		(0.81)		(0.62)
Exposure to Natives						
Neighborhood		0.38***		0.47***		0.42***
		(0.09)		(0.16)		(0.14)
Classroom		4.49***		4.72***		4.35***
		(0.55)		(0.89)		(0.61)

Notes: (1) Models are logistic regressions predicting nominating at least one native best friend using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (2) tests in brackets are of whether the coefficient on the 3rd generation (and mixed 2nd generation) differs significantly from the coefficient on the 2nd generation; (3) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001; ns – not significant

Table A-3
Network Inclusion by Immigrant Generation and Ethnic Origin

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1. Baseline	2. Adjusted	3. Baseline	4. Adjusted	5. Baseline	6. Adjusted
Origin, Generation (ref: "Native", 4+)						
Turkey, 2nd	-0.40*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.02)				
Turkey, Mixed 2nd	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)				
Turkey, 3rd	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)				
Russia/Poland, 2nd	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.01)				
Russia/Poland, Mixed 2nd	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)				
Russia/Poland, 3rd	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)				
Other Europe, 2nd	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)				
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd	-0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)				
Other Europe, 3rd	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)				
Origin, Generation (ref: "Native", 4+)						
Turkey/Morocco, 2nd			-0.45*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.02)		
Turkey/Morocco, Mixed 2nd			-0.27*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)		
Turkey/Morocco, 3rd			0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)		
Suriname, 2nd			-0.21*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)		
Suriname, Mixed 2nd			-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)		
Suriname, 3rd			-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		
Other Europe, 2nd			-0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)		
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd			0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)		
Other Europe, 3rd			0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		

Germany brackets: Turkey 2nd/Mixed 2nd: ns (adjusted); Turkey group overall: ns; Russia/Poland 2nd–Mixed 2nd: *; Russia/Poland group: ***; Other Europe 2nd–Mixed 2nd: **; Other Europe group: ***.

Netherlands brackets: Turkey/Morocco 2nd–Mixed 2nd: **; Turkey/Morocco group: ***; Suriname 2nd–Mixed 2nd: ***; Suriname group: ***; Other Europe 2nd–Mixed 2nd: ns; Other Europe group: ns.

Origin, Generation
(ref: "Native", 4+)

India/Pakistan, 2nd		-0.55***	-0.23***
		(0.02)	(0.02)
India/Pakistan, Mixed 2nd		-0.45***	-0.16***
		(0.02)	(0.02)
India/Pakistan, 3rd		-0.24**	-0.08***
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Jamaica, 2nd		-0.33***	-0.19***
		(0.06)	(0.06)
Jamaica, Mixed 2nd		-0.18***	-0.05
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Jamaica, 3rd		-0.14***	-0.09***
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Europe, 2nd		-0.15***	-0.02
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd		-0.01	0.02
		(0.02)	(0.01)
Other Europe, 3rd		-0.01	0.04**
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Parental SES	0.00**	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender (ref: girl)	0.01	-0.01*	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Religion (ref: none)			
Christian	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Islamic	-0.24***	-0.30***	-0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Other	-0.02	0.00	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Exposure to Natives			
Neighborhood	0.02***	0.00*	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Classroom	0.20***	0.23***	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Notes: (1) Models are logistic regressions predicting nomination by at least one native classmate using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (2) tests in brackets are of whether the coefficient on the 3rd generation (and mixed 2nd generation) differs significantly from the coefficient on the 2nd generation; (3) * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.001$; ns – not significant

Table A-4
Co-ethnic Networks by Immigrant Generation and Country of Residence

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted
Generation (ref: 2nd Gen)						
Mixed 2nd	-0.77***	-0.36	-1.44***	-0.10	-0.41***	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.51)	(0.38)	(0.47)
3rd Gen	-2.59***	-1.44***	-3.65***	-2.11***	-1.87***	-0.75
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.54)	(0.70)	(0.37)	(0.51)
Parental SES		-0.02**		0.00		-0.02*
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Gender (ref: girl)		-0.14		-0.54		0.17
		(0.19)		(0.37)		(0.36)
Religion (ref: none)						
Christian		0.41		0.83		0.37
		(0.33)		(0.73)		(0.55)
Islamic		2.17***		2.09***		1.41***
		(0.38)		(0.60)		(0.52)
Other		0.71		-0.90		1.50***
		(0.46)		(0.68)		(0.51)
Exposure to Natives						
Neighborhood		-0.24**		-0.36**		-0.25
		(0.10)		(0.18)		(0.20)
Classroom		-2.81***		-2.81***		-3.22***
		(0.64)		(0.96)		(0.74)

Notes: (1) Models are logistic regressions predicting nomination by at least 1 co-ethnic best friend using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (2) * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.001$

Table A-5
Co-ethnic Networks by Immigrant Generation and Ethnic Origin

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted
Origin, Generation (ref: Turkey 2nd)						
Turkey, Mixed 2nd	-0.19***	-0.07				
	(0.04)	(0.05)				
Turkey, 3rd	-0.26**	-0.11				
	(0.10)	(0.10)				
Russia/Poland, 2nd	-0.39***	-0.13**				
	(0.03)	(0.05)				
Russia/Poland, Mixed 2nd	-0.50***	-0.22***				
	(0.04)	(0.06)				
Russia/Poland, 3rd	-0.74***	-0.40***				
	(0.03)	(0.05)				
Origin, Generation (ref: Turkey/Morocco, 2nd)						
Turkey/Morocco, Mixed 2nd			-0.11*	0.11*		
			(0.05)	(0.05)		
Turkey/Morocco, 3rd			-0.68***	-0.11		
			(0.05)	(0.07)		
Suriname, 2nd			-0.26***	0.31***		
			(0.05)	(0.07)		
Suriname, Mixed 2nd			-0.63***	0.01		
			(0.05)	(0.07)		
Suriname, 3rd			0.69***	-0.14*		
			(0.04)	(0.07)		
Origin, Generation (ref: India/Pakistan, 2nd)						
India/Pakistan, Mixed 2nd					-0.06	0.02
					(0.04)	(0.04)
India/Pakistan, 3rd					-0.25***	-0.07
					(0.05)	(0.05)
Jamaica, 2nd					-0.26**	-0.05
					(0.10)	(0.10)
Jamaica, Mixed 2nd					-0.13	0.14
					(0.07)	(0.07)
Jamaica, 3rd					-0.52***	-0.13*
					(0.05)	(0.07)
Parental SES		0.00**		0.00		0.00***
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Gender (ref: girl)		-0.02		-0.11***		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Religion (ref: none)						
Christianity		0.08		0.07		0.11*
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)

Islam	0.30***	0.50***	0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Other	0.13*	-0.17***	0.28***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Exposure to Natives			
Neighborhood	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Classroom	-0.37***	-0.30***	-0.38***
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)

Notes: (1) Models are logistic regressions predicting nomination by at least 1 co-ethnic best friend using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (2) within each ethnic group that is not included in the reference category, brackets indicate a test of whether its 3rd generation (and mixed 2nd generation) members differ significantly from its 2nd generation members; (3) * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.001$

Table A-6
National Identification by Immigrant Generation and Country of Residence

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted
Generation (ref: 4+)						
2nd Gen	-1.08***	-0.64***	-0.89***	-0.78***	-0.46***	-0.40***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Mixed 2nd	-0.67***	-0.47**	-0.41***	-0.38***	-0.51***	-0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
3rd Gen	-0.21***	-0.16***	-0.28***	-0.22***	-0.37***	-0.34***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Parental SES		0.00		0.00***		0.00***
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Gender (ref: girl)		0.03		0.01		0.11***
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Religion (ref: none)						
Christianity		0.08**		0.02		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Islam		-0.52***		-0.26***		0.08
		(0.06)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Other		-0.10		-0.01		-0.14*
		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.06)
Exposure to Natives						
Neighborhood		0.11***		0.01		0.05***
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Classroom		0.24***		-0.11		-0.03
		(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.08)

Notes: (1) Models are OLS regressions predicting strength of national identification on a 4-point scale using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (2) tests in brackets are of whether the coefficient on the 3rd generation (and mixed 2nd generation) differs significantly from the coefficient on the 2nd generation; (3) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001; ns – not significant

Table A-7
National Identification by Immigrant Generation and Ethnic Origin

Origin, Generation (ref: "Native", 4+)	Germany 1. Baseline	Germany 2. Adjusted	Netherlands 3. Baseline	Netherlands 4. Adjusted	England 5. Baseline	England 6. Adjusted
Turkey, 2nd	-1.28*** (0.05)	-0.70*** (0.08)				
Turkey, Mixed 2nd	-1.16*** (0.08)	-0.69*** (0.09)				
Turkey, 3rd	-1.18*** (0.19)	-0.90*** (0.19)				
Russia/Poland, 2nd	-0.64*** (0.05)	-0.55*** (0.05)				
Russia/Poland, Mixed 2nd	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.23*** (0.08)				
Russia/Poland, 3rd	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)				
Other Europe, 2nd	-1.32*** (0.07)	-0.99*** (0.08)				
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd	-0.61*** (0.05)	-0.53*** (0.05)				
Other Europe, 3rd	-0.30*** (0.05)	-0.27*** (0.05)				

Origin, Generation
(ref: "Native", 4+)

Origin, Generation (ref: "Native", 4+)	Germany 1. Baseline	Germany 2. Adjusted	Netherlands 3. Baseline	Netherlands 4. Adjusted	England 5. Baseline	England 6. Adjusted
Turkey/Morocco, 2nd			-0.92*** (0.06)	-0.54*** (0.13)		
Turkey/Morocco, Mixed 2nd			-0.58*** (0.12)	-0.25 (0.14)		
Turkey/Morocco, 3rd			-0.19 (0.12)	-0.17 (0.12)		
Suriname, 2nd			-1.04*** (0.11)	-1.04*** (0.12)		
Suriname, Mixed 2nd			-0.58*** (0.11)	-0.58*** (0.11)		
Suriname, 3rd			-0.18* (0.09)	-0.18* (0.09)		
Other Europe, 2nd			-0.73*** (0.10)	-0.73*** (0.10)		
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd			-0.35*** (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.05)		
Other Europe, 3rd			-0.36*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)		

Origin, Generation
(ref: "Native", 4+)

India/Pakistan, 2nd		-0.35***	-0.12
		(0.07)	(0.11)
India/Pakistan, Mixed 2nd		-0.48***	-0.27**
		(0.07)	(0.10)
India/Pakistan, 3rd		-0.38***	-0.20
		(0.11)	(0.11)
Jamaica, 2nd		-0.67*	-0.60*
		(0.31)	(0.31)
Jamaica, Mixed 2nd		-0.38**	-0.32*
		(0.16)	(0.16)
Jamaica, 3rd		-0.46***	-0.44***
		(0.11)	(0.11)
Other Europe, 2nd		-1.07***	-0.96***
		(0.17)	(0.17)
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd		-0.55***	-0.52***
		(0.06)	(0.06)
Other Europe, 3rd		-0.34***	-0.31***
		(0.07)	(0.07)
Parental SES	0.00	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender (ref: girl)	0.04	0.01	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religion (ref: none)			
Christianity	0.07**	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Islam	-0.43***	-0.46***	-0.13
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Other	-0.09	0.02	-0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Exposure to Natives			
Neighborhood	0.10***	0.01	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Classroom	0.19**	-0.12	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)

Notes: (1) Models are OLS regressions predicting strength of national identification on a 4-point scale using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (2) tests in brackets are of whether the coefficient on the 3rd generation (and mixed 2nd generation) differs significantly from the coefficient on the 2nd generation; (3) p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001; ns – not significant.

Table A-8
Ethnic Identification by Immigrant Generation and Country of Residence

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted
Generation (ref: 2nd)						
Mixed 2nd Gen	-0.73***	-0.46***	-1.79***	-1.18***	-0.65***	-0.13
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
3rd Gen	-1.74***	-1.28***	-2.49***	-1.78***	-0.83***	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Native, 4+ Gen	-2.02***	-1.50***	-2.74***	-2.00***	-2.13***	-1.09***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Parental SES		-0.00		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Gender (ref: girl)		-0.04		-0.04		-0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Religion (ref: none)						
Christianity		-0.13***		-0.09***		0.02
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Islam		0.48***		1.07***		1.21***
		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.10)
Other		0.13		0.28**		0.73***
		(0.11)		(0.06)		(0.08)
Exposure to Natives						
Neighborhood		-0.17***		-0.01		-0.06
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Classroom		-0.40***		0.01		-0.37***
		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.09)

Notes: (1) Models are OLS regressions predicting strength of ethnic identification on a 4-point scale where a value of 0 indicates no ethnic identification and a value of 1-4 indicates strength of ethnic minority identity, where larger values indicate stronger identification; (2) using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (3) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001

Table A-9
Ethnic Identification by Immigrant Generation and Ethnic Origin

	Germany		Netherlands		England	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted	Baseline	Adjusted
Origin, Generation (ref: Turkey, 2nd)						
Turkey, Mixed 2nd	-0.42**	-0.36*				
	(0.14)	(0.14)				
Turkey, 3rd	-0.11	-0.04				
	(0.31)	(0.31)				
Russia/Poland, 2nd	-0.91***	-0.72***				
	(0.11)	(0.14)				
Russia/Poland, Mixed 2nd	-1.58***	-1.42***				
	(0.14)	(0.17)				
Russia/Poland, 3rd	-2.45***	-2.16***				
	(0.11)	(0.14)				
Other Europe, 2nd	-0.71***	-0.67***				
	(0.13)	(0.14)				
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd	-1.31***	-1.12***				
	(0.11)	(0.14)				
Other Europe, 3rd	-2.10***	-1.85***				
	(0.10)	(0.14)				
"Native", 4+	-2.45***	-2.15***				
	(0.07)	(0.12)				
Origin, Generation (ref: Turkey/Morocco, 2nd)						
Turkey/Morocco, Mixed 2nd			-0.81***	-0.52**		
			(0.08)	(0.18)		
Turkey/Morocco, 3rd			-1.87***	-0.98***		
			(0.17)	(0.22)		
Suriname, 2nd			-0.28	0.52*		
			(0.17)	(0.22)		
Suriname, Mixed 2nd			-1.17***	-0.28		
			(0.16)	(0.22)		
Suriname, 3rd			-2.85***	-1.86***		
			(0.14)	(0.20)		
Other Europe, 2nd			-0.80	0.11		
			(0.14)	(0.20)		
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd			-2.40***	-1.39***		
			(0.10)	(0.18)		
Other Europe, 3rd			-2.88***	-1.86***		
			(0.10)	(0.19)		
"Native", 4+			-2.97***	-1.95***		
			(0.08)	(0.17)		
Origin, Generation (ref: India/Pakistan, 2nd)						

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
India/Pakistan, Mixed 2nd		-0.06 (0.12)	0.02 (0.11)
India/Pakistan, 3rd		0.10 (0.15)	0.46*** (0.16)
Jamaica, 2nd		-1.32*** (0.31)	-0.57 (0.31)
Jamaica, Mixed 2nd		-0.46* (0.20)	0.23 (0.22)
Jamaica, 3rd		-0.61*** (0.16)	0.18 (0.18)
Other Europe, 2nd		-0.43 (0.22)	0.14 (0.24)
Other Europe, Mixed 2nd		-1.42*** (0.11)	-0.63*** (0.14)
Other Europe, 3rd		-1.53*** (0.12)	-0.75*** (0.14)
"Native", 4+		-2.27*** (0.08)	-1.39*** (0.12)
Parental SES	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender (ref: girl)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Religion (ref: none)			
Christianity	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Islam	-0.04 (0.12)	1.01*** (0.17)	0.89*** (0.12)
Other	0.07 (0.11)	0.18** (0.06)	0.56*** (0.08)
Exposure to Natives			
Neighborhood	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Classroom	-0.32** (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)	-0.25** (0.09)

Bracket significance markers (within-group generation comparisons): Jamaica block: * and *; Other Europe block: *** and ***.

Notes: (1) Models are OLS regressions predicting strength of ethnic identification on a 4-point scale where a value of 0 indicates no ethnic identification and a value of 1-4 indicates strength of ethnic minority identity, where larger values indicate stronger identification; (2) using survey weights that account for survey design and nonresponse; (3) within each ethnic group that is not included in the reference category, brackets indicate a test of whether its 3rd generation (and mixed 2nd generation) members differ significantly from its 2nd generation members; (4) * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.001$; ns – not significant.

Figure A-1. Predicted Probability of a Best Friend Nomination by ≥ 1 Native (4+ Gen) Classmates, by Immigrant Generation and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted probabilities based on estimates from separate logistic regressions for each country of residence; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood, and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted probabilities

Figure A-2. Predicted Probability of a Best Friend Nomination by ≥ 1 Native (4+ Gen) Classmates, by Immigrant Generation, Ethnic Origin, and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted probabilities based on estimates from separate logistic regressions for each country of residence; (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood, and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predicted probabilities following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country (4) Bars are 95% CI on predicted probabilities

Figure A-3. Strength of Ethnic Identification by Generation and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted strength of ethnic identification among those that identify with a minority ethnic group in their destination country, and where the strength of ethnic identification takes on values of 1-4, where larger values indicate stronger identification (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood, and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predictions following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country (4) Bars are 95% CI

Figure A-4. Strength of Ethnic Identification by Immigrant Generation, Ethnic Origin, and Country of Residence

Notes: (1) Predicted strength of ethnic identification among those that identify with a minority ethnic group in their destination country, and where the strength of ethnic identification takes on values of 1-4, where larger values indicate stronger identification (2) Adjusted models account for parental SES, gender, religious affiliation, neighborhood, and classroom exposure to natives; (3) Predictions following adjusted models (dashed bars) hold controls at their means or modal categories within each country (4) Bars are 95% CI